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Okay, Circuits, Now Let’s Get in Formation: A Call to Reform the Copyright Fair Use Doctrine 
April Campos 
 
I. Introduction 
Regardless of whether an artist is already a superstar or aspiring to be, the questions 
surrounding the lawfulness of sampling other artists’ creations are equally vast and complex.1  
Artists we listen to every day are too often embroiled in lawsuits regarding music sampling.  One 
such artist, Beyoncé Knowles-Carter, is currently involved in a lawsuit with the estate of Anthony 
Barre.2  The estate accuses Beyoncé of sampling audio3 from two YouTube videos created and 
posted by the late New Orleans rapper and comedian, Messy Mya,4 without the consent of his 
estate.5  Beyoncé alleges the samples of Messy Mya’s clips constitute fair use and the dispute is 
currently pending before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.  
These disputes, and countless others like them6 illustrate a problem with copyright law and 
                                                     
 J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., University of North Carolina at Wilmington. 
1 The legality of music sampling has, for some time, depended on what jurisdiction the sampling took place in, and 
has been guided by inconsistently applied doctrines of fair use, de minimis, and copyright infringement. Ryan 
Lloyd, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in the Changing Music Landscape, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 155–62 (2014).  
For purposes of this Comment, music sampling will be analyzed in the context of the fair use doctrine.  
2 Anthony Barre was an American rapper and YouTube personality better known by his stage name, “Messy Mya.”  
Peter A. Berry, Beyonce’s Use of Rapper Messy Mya’s Voice in Her Song “Formation” is Justified, Lawyers Say, 
XXLMAG (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.xxlmag.com/news/2017/09/beyonce-messy-mya-formation-justified-
lawsuit/. 
3 Music sampling is the use of small portions of existing sound records to create new audio.  Bruce J. McGiverin, 
Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1987).  
4 See supra note 2. 
5 See infra Part III.C. 
6 An early example of music sampling was the Sugarhill Gang’s “Rapper’s Delight,” which sampled “Good Times” 
by the band Chic.  Steven Daly, Hip-Hop Happens, VANITY FAIR, (Nov. 2005), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2005/11/hiphop200511.  Nile Rodgers and Bernard Edwards, who wrote “Good 
Times,” threatened to sue the Sugarhill Gang, and the parties eventually reached a settlement whereby Rodgers and 
Edwards were credited as co-writers.  Id.  Shawn Corey Carter, husband of Beyonce Knowles-Carter and a well-
known rapper professionally known as Jay-Z, has been sued numerous times over unauthorized music sampling.  See, 
e.g., C. Vernon Coleman II, Beyonce and Jay Z Win “Drunk in Love” Sampling Lawsuit, XXLMAG (Dec. 19, 2015), 
http://www.xxlmag.com/news/2015/12/beyonce-and-jay-z-win-drunk-in-love-sampling-lawsuit/; Daniel Nussbaum, 
Music Lawsuit Frenzy: Jay-Z Latest to Settle Copyright Claim, Awards 50% Royalties to Swiss Musician, BREITBART 
(Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-hollywood/2015/03/13/music-lawsuit-frenzy-jay-z-latest-to-settle-
copyright-claim-awards-50-royalties-to-swiss-musician/; Barbara Ross, Jay Z, Kanye West Stole ‘Made in America’ 
Song: Law Suit, DAILYNEWS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/jay-z-kanye-west-
stole-made-america-song-lawsuit-article-1.1928591; Andrew Flanagan, Jay Z Sued By Litigious Label TufAmerica 
 3 
specifically, the fair use doctrine7 today.  Inconsistent applications of the fair use doctrine have 
wide-ranging implications: artists are stifled by legal complexities and courts lack clear directives 
from either the Supreme Court or the legislature.  Coupled with the boom of streaming and social 
media platforms, these inconsistencies have opened the door for ever-increasing amounts of 
litigation in this area of the law.8  The fair use doctrine is intended to balance the interests of 
copyright holders with the public interest by allowing certain limited uses that would otherwise be 
considered infringement.  By offering protection to a secondary user from being liable to the 
copyright holder, the fair use doctrine is supposed to serve the public interest by promoting 
creativity.  The secondary user is often the “little guy” or the “amateur/aspiring artist” while the 
copyright holder is most often known as the “celebrity,” the “record label,” or the “entertainment 
conglomerate.”  By allowing the “big guy” to exploit fair use at the expense of the “little guy,” the 
legal framework has strayed away from the original purposes of fair use by effectively silencing 
the creativity the fair use doctrine is meant to protect.  
This Comment will briefly provide background on and describe developments in the fair 
use doctrine that led to the current circuit split, address why the current standards of fair use are 
outdated, and explain the need for legislative or Supreme Court clarification on the proper weight 
to be attributed to each of the four factors of the fair use doctrine.  Part II of this Comment will 
briefly review the evolution of the doctrine of fair use: its origins from a judicially created 
                                                     
over Infringement on ‘Run This Town’, BILLBOARDBIZ (Nov. 11, 2013), 
https://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-management/5785840/jay-z-sued-by-litigious-label-
tufamerica-over; Paul Cantor, Notorious B.I.G.., Jay-Z Plagued with Similar Music Sample Issues As Game in the 
Past, MTV NEWS (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.mtv.com/news/2494916/notorious-big-jay-z-plagued-with-similar-
music-sample-issues-as-game-in-the-past/. 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See Robert M. Vrana, The Remix Artist’s Catch-22: A Proposal for Compulsory Licensing for Transformative, 
Sampling-Based Music, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 812 (2011) (noting that the uncertain law has a “chilling effect” 
on artists); Lloyd, supra note 1, at 163 (arguing that inconsistent judgments have had a “negative effect on both the 
sampling artists and the rightsholders.”). 
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exception recognized at common law to a codified infringement defense.  Part II will also examine 
the circuit split between the Second and Seventh Circuits in weighing the importance of each of 
the four fair use factors.  Part III of this Comment will discuss the difficulty in conforming current 
standards to address copyright issues with user-generated content on social media platforms.  
Finally, Part IV will discuss why there is an urgent need for clarification on the proper fair use 
standard and the remedies available to tackle the situation. 
 
II. Copyright Law, the History of the Fair Use Doctrine, and the Circuit Split 
A. The Origins of the Copyright Fair Use Doctrine 
Copyright law derives its authority from Article I, Section Eight of the United States 
Constitution, which provides, in relevant part: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings . . . .”9  The original and continuing purpose of the copyright is 
“to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public.”10  A 
perspective promulgated by legal scholars and jurists is that American copyright law is grounded 
in utilitarianism.11  According to the utilitarian theory, copyright law gives exclusive rights to 
authors for a limited amount of time as an incentive to create works for the benefit of society as a 
whole.12  Without guaranteed rights in their creative production, authors faced with the problem 
of free riders would not be able to profit from their own creations.13  The Copyright Act,14 however, 
                                                     
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
10 Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (1990).  
11 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 
(1989).  
12 See Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enter’s, 471 U.S. 549, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable right 
to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).  
13 Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 620 (2015). 
14 17 U.S.C. §§ 1–8, 10–12 (2012). 
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does require boundaries on the rights provided to authors.15  In order to balance the interests of 
promoting the public welfare without diminishing the incentive to create,16 copyright law permits 
limited use of copyrighted materials without having to first acquire permission from the copyright 
holder by defining the use as a permissible “fair use.”17     
Fair use provides for the legal, unlicensed citation or incorporation of copyrighted material 
in another author’s works under a four-factor test.18  The fair use doctrine is intended to balance 
the interests of copyright holders with the public interest in the wider distribution and use of 
creative works by allowing certain limited uses that might otherwise be considered infringement.19  
Fair use has been recognized in common law since the Statute of Anne of 170920 and originated 
as part of a judicially created common law exception.21  In Flosom v. Marsh,22 Justice Joseph Story 
set forth the factors in the fair use analysis23 and these four factors were codified by Congress 
under the Copyright Act of 1976.24  The non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in the fair 
use analysis, as codified by Congress, are: “(1) the nature and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;”25 “(2) the 
                                                     
15 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997).  
16 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is 
to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good . . . the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.”). 
17 17 U.S.C. §107 (2012). 
18 Id. 
19 Leval, supra note 10, at 1109–10. 
20 See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740) (recognizing that “fair abridgement” does not infringe on 
an author’s rights). 
21 Id. 
22 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
23 “The question of piracy, often depends upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of 
the other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects of each work; and the degree to which 
each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to the same common sources of information, or to have exercise 
the same common diligence in the selection and arrangement of the materials.”  Id.   
24 § 107.  
25 Id.  In analyzing the purpose and character of the work, courts consider the transformative nature of the work and 
ask “whether the new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”  See 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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nature of the copyrighted work;”26 “(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole;”27 “and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.”28  
Section 107 of the Copyright Act specifically enumerates fair use as a limitation on the 
exclusive right enjoyed by authors.29  It provides: “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of §§ 106 and 
106A [granting certain rights to authors], the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”30  When Congress codified the fair 
use doctrine, it did not define fair use but instead provided a non-exhaustive list of illustrative 
uses—such as criticism, scholarship, and news reporting—that may qualify as fair use.31  The 
Supreme Court had traditionally characterized fair use as an affirmative defense, but in Lenz v. 
Universal Music Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
fair use was not merely a defense to an infringement claim, but was an expressly authorized right, 
and an exception to the exclusive rights granted to the author of a creative work by copyright law.32    
The first factor (purpose and character of the use) focuses on the intended aim of the use 
and courts typically favor non-commercial uses such as educational or newsreporting use, over 
commercial uses.33  The first factor considers whether the use is “transformative,” focusing on 
                                                     
26 § 107.  Works that are more factual in nature or employ common images are less likely to receive the same amount 
of protections as creative, individual works.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
27 § 107.  This factor must be analyzed in terms of the “quantitative and qualitative aspect of the portion of the 
copyrighted material taken.”  See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006).  
28 § 107.  Although not dispositive, the final factor has been heralded by some courts as “the single most important 
element of fair use.”  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (citing Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476 (1984). 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994).  
32 801 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2263 (2017).  “Fair use is therefore distinct from 
affirmative defenses where a use infringes a copyright, but there is no liability due to a valid excuse, e.g., misuse of a 
copyright.”  Id.  
33 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
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“whether the new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”34  A use may be considered transformative if it is made for a sufficiently 
distinct purpose or function—such as a search engine35 or a parody.36  
 The second factor (the nature of the work) relates to the type of copyrighted work at issue.37  
This factor analyzes the connection of the original work to the goals of copyright law.38  
Unpublished works are afforded broader copyright protection and the availability of the fair use 
defense is narrower.39  Creative works such as paintings or musical compositions enjoy a greater 
copyright protection than is afforded to informational works, such as a newspaper article.40  The 
second fair use factor weighs against the secondary user if the original copyrighted work is 
unpublished and/or creative in nature.41  
 The third factor (the amount and substantiality of the portion used) is analyzed in terms of 
the “quantitative and qualitative aspects of the portion of the copyrighted material taken.”42  The 
qualitative aspect of the third factor focuses on the “substantiality” of what has been copied.43  A 
secondary work may be considered an unfair use if it copies the “heart of the work,” even if only 
a small of amount of the original was actually copied.44  The “heart” of the work refers to the main 
source of the work’s economic value.45  The third factor stands for the proposition that all other 
                                                     
34 Id. at 579 (citing Flosom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)). 
35 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).  
36 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 579.  An example is the promotion of artistic expression.  Id.  
39 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985).  
40 See, e.g., Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993). 
41 Id.  
42 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006).  
43 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66. 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  In Harper & Row, the court held that even though the number of words copied from President Ford’s memoir 
was “insubstantial,” the third factor favored the original copyright holder because the small part that was copied was 
the primary subject that readers would be interested in: why President Ford pardoned Richard Nixon.  Id.  
 8 
factors being equal, a use is more likely to be fair if it copies only a small amount from the original 
work and what was copied is not the “heart” of the work.46  
 The final factor (market effect) considers the effect that a secondary work has on the market 
for the original work.47  The fourth factor has been proclaimed as the “undoubtedly the single most 
important element of fair use.”48  The Supreme Court, however, limited this emphasis on the fourth 
factor in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., by stating that the fair use test should “not be simplified 
with bright-line rules[,] . . . the four statutory factors [should not] be treated in isolation[, and] . . . 
all [four factors] are to be explored and the results weighed together.”49  The Supreme Court held 
that the market effect should be given less weight when the use is transformative.50  The Court 
reasoned that if a secondary work was sufficiently transformative, there would be a lesser 
likelihood that the work would replace the market for the original.51  In certain situations—for 
example where the original copyright holder is an aspiring artist and the secondary user is an 
established artist—the market factor should, in fact, weigh heavily in a fair use decision.  
B. Transformation vs. Market Effect: The Circuit Split Regarding the Four Fair Use Factors 
The circuit split discussed in this Comment focuses on the difference in methodologies 
employed by the regional circuit courts with respect to the four fair use factors—particularly, the 
Second Circuit’s emphasis on the degree to which an allegedly infringing work is transformative 
and the more economic-focused approach employed by the Seventh Circuit.  In 1984, the Supreme 
Court decided Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., and acknowledged that “[t]he 
doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, ‘the most troublesome in the whole 
                                                     
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 566.  
49 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 591. 
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law of copyright.’”52  The root of the problem with fair use is that Congress did not “provide 
definitive rules when it codified the fair use doctrine in the 1976 [Copyright] Act; it simply 
incorporated a list of factors ‘to be considered.’”53  This has caused problems with consistency in 
the application of the fair use principles and a divided court system.  In Harper & Row Publishers 
v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court proclaimed the fourth factor as “undoubtedly the most 
important element of fair use.”54  This proclamation installed the inquiry into market harm as the 
predominant issue in any fair use analysis and essentially made it highly unlikely that any use that 
was commercial in nature would qualify as fair use.55  But following the seminal article by Judge 
Pierre N. Leval56 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,57 a new 
strain of fair use jurisprudence emerged in the early 1990s.  Judge Leval’s article was published 
following a period of inconsistent decisions among the courts and a period of reversals that had a 
significant impact on fair use jurisprudence in the 1980s.58  Judge Leval’s article maintains that 
copyright jurisprudence serves a utilitarian purpose59 and suggests that the judiciary should look 
to the main purpose of fair use, which is to ensure that copyright protections do not become so 
expansive as to throttle innovation.60  In his article, Judge Leval argued that the key determination 
in a fair use analysis must be whether, and to what extent, the alleged infringing use is 
                                                     
52 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, 
Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)); see also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 
F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 
(1978). 
53 Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 476. 
54 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) 
55 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 722 (2011).  
56 See Leval, supra note 10, at 1111. 
57 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  
58 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp of Am., 480 F.Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 
(9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 557 F. 
Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d. 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).  
59 See Leval, supra note 10, at 1118.  
60 Id. at 1109. 
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transformative.61  He went on to further explain that the use “must be productive and must employ 
the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original”62 and 
pronounced that if the secondary work added “value” to the original work then it encompassed the 
very type of activity fair use was meant to protect.63  Judge Leval essentially asserts that the soul 
of the fair use analysis is the first factor.64 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court relaxed the traditional fair use standard by adopting much 
of the philosophy in Judge Leval’s article, in particular his definition of the first factor of the fair 
use analysis.65  Campbell addressed a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” by the rap 
group 2 Live Crew.66  The Supreme Court held that the inquiry for the first factor of the fair use 
analysis turns on whether, and to what extent, the alleged infringing use is transformative.67  The 
Supreme Court further explained that “the more transformative the new work, the less significant 
the other factors will be, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”68  It is 
important to note that, in Campbell, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the fair use 
factors are analyzed under fact-sensitive inquiries and should be considered together without any 
bright line rules.69  Following Campbell, the circuit courts widely adopted the transformative use 
inquiry, with the Second Circuit being particularly vocal in its support of the transformative use 
inquiry and instrumental in expanding fair use by using a liberal “transformation” test.70   
                                                     
61 Id. at 1111. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1116. 
65 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994). 
66 Id. at 572. 
67 Id. at 569. 
68 Id.  Importantly, the Supreme Court also corrected its previous statement in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc. that commercial uses are presumptively unfair.  Id. at 594. 
69 Id. at 577 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
70 See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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The Second Circuit transformation standard, as defined in Cariou v. Prince,71 set a liberal 
precedent for what the Second Circuit would consider “transformative.”  In Cariou, the Second 
Circuit was tasked with examining whether Richard Prince’s “Canal Zone Series” sufficiently 
transformed Patrick Cariou’s photographs in such a way as to constitute a fair use by Prince.72  
Cariou’s original works were photographs of Rastafarians in natural scenic setting, taken for the 
purpose of being featured in the book Yes Rasta.73  Prince used Cariou’s photographs featured in 
this book and superimposed them with images and colored, oval-shaped blotches of color on top 
of the original work.74  Prince juxtaposed the scenic images with images of musical instruments 
with the goal of creating dystopian scenery through the photo series.75  Some of the works were in 
fact more transformed than others, but the majority consisted of Prince using Cariou’s entire 
photograph and adding a handful of elements.76  The Second Circuit held that an unauthorized 
work’s transformative nature does not depend on whether it “comments” on the original work, but 
rather whether it has altered the original work with a “new expression, meaning, or message.”77  
This decision signified an important shift in fair use jurisprudence because the “comment upon” 
requirement had previously been an important consideration for determining the nature of 
unauthorized derivative works.78  Additionally, this decision was noteworthy due to the Second 
Circuit’s deliberate decision to ignore the negative financial impact that Prince’s exhibit had on 
Cariou’s ability to display his own works for monetary gain.79  The Second Circuit considered the 
                                                     
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 698.  
73 Id. at 699. 
74 Id. at 701. 
75 Id. at 705. 
76 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705.  
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  The district court case went into great detail regarding the market effect of Prince’s work on Cariou.  Cariou v. 
Prince, 784 F.Supp. 2d 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  The gallery that showed Prince’s “Canal Zone Series,” ending up 
selling eight of the thirty pieces of art in the “Canal Zone Series” for approximately 10 million dollars, of which Prince 
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market factor to be unimportant because of the transformative nature of Prince’s work.80  The 
Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou, served to further broaden81 the scope of the Campbell 
decision, not only because it mitigated the importance of the fourth statutory factor of fair use, but 
also because it lowered the threshold for transformation by not requiring the unauthorized work to 
comment on the original work.82 
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Second Circuit’s emphasis 
on transformativeness in the Cariou v. Prince decision.83  Rejecting the transformative use 
paradigm, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the fourth factor was the most important of the four 
statutory fair use factors.84  In Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit was tasked with determining whether 
fair use existed where a copyrighted photograph of the mayor of a town in Wisconsin was turned 
lime green, used to make t-shirts and tank tops emblazoned with the words “Sorry for Partying,” 
and sold by Sconnie Nation on clothing for a marginal profit.85  The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin held that three of the four fair use factors weighed in favor 
of Sconnie Nation.86  The district court noted that the crux of the first inquiry turned on whether 
the new work “supersedes the original work, or instead adds something new with a further purpose 
                                                     
received approximately 6 million dollars.  Id.  This is particularly relevant because, at about the same time, another 
New York City art gallery had been planning to display Cariou’s photographs as featured in Yes Rasta.  Id.  Once the 
gallery owner found out about the showing of Prince’s work at the other gallery, she cancelled Cariou’s show because 
it had “been done already.”  Id.  Cariou planned on selling copies of his books and prints of his photographs ranging 
from $3,000 to $20,000 at this gallery showing.  Id. 
80 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709–10.  
81 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).  The Second Circuit considered 
whether chronological assemblage of reduced-format posters in a biography of the Grateful Dead titled Illustrated 
Trip constituted fair use.  Id. at 606.  The Second Circuit held that each poster differed from its original expressive 
purpose due to the bibliographic nature of the book, and accordingly was transformative.  Id. at 609.  This case 
broadened Campbell by holding that even when a secondary user takes an entire work, the use can still be considered 
transformative, so long as the use does not supersede the original work.  Id.  
82 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705. 
83 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
84 Id. at 758 (emphasis added). 
85 Id. at 757. 
86 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1055 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (finding that the purpose and 
character of the use, the amount and substantiality of the portion taken, and the effect of the use on the potential market 
weighed in favor of Sconnie Nation). 
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or of a different character.”87  The court also commented, with regards to the market effect factor, 
that seeing Kienitz’s image next to the Sconnie Nation shirts, it was evident that the shirts “were 
not a substitute for and did not reduce the demand for Kienitz’s photographic portrait . . . .”88  The 
district court supported its rationale by citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell.89  The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision finding that Sconnie Nation’s use of the 
image constituted fair use but used a different reasoning.90  In so holding, the Seventh Circuit held 
that transformative use was not a statutory factor and that it would be better to stick to the four 
statutory factors set forth in section 107.91  The Seventh Circuit went on to further maintain that 
the fourth factor, market effect, should be the most important when analyzing fair use.92  The 
Seventh Circuit’s position following Kienitz seemingly rejects the fair use jurisprudence that 
developed following Judge Leval’s article and the Supreme Court decision in Campbell.  Although 
the Seventh Circuit’s criticisms were levied specifically towards the Second Circuit and towards 
Cariou, the language and analysis is dismissive of transformative use as a whole.  The clash 
highlighted by Kienitz and Cariou centers on the difference in the approaches employed by the 
regional circuits regarding the four statutory fair use factors—principally the approach taken by 
the Second Circuit that focuses on the degree to which a secondary work is “transformative,” and 
the market-centered approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit.  
III. Current Copyright Standards Have Been Unable to Adapt and Cope with the Rapid 
Rise of the Internet and Social Media 
 
                                                     
87 Id. at 1049. 
88 Id. at 1054. 
89 Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)). 
90 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 760.  
91 Id. at 758. 
92 Id. 
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In an age where emerging artists are increasingly flocking to social media platforms to 
exhibit their work, it has become increasingly difficult for the law, as it currently stands, to provide 
adequate protections for this subset of artists.  
A. The Fundamentals of Copyright Protection 
The 1976 Copyright Act defines copyrightable material as “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”93  “Works of authorship” are further defined to 
include a list of eight non-exhaustive categories.94  Courts look to whether a work is both “original 
and “fixed,” rather than focusing on whether a work falls into one of the listed categories of Section 
102.95  “Originality,” however, is defined nowhere in the copyright statute or in the Constitution 
even though it is a defining element of copyright law.96  As a result, interpretation of the notion of 
originality has developed over time.97  The threshold of creativity necessary to receive copyright 
privileges is extremely low and protection applies broadly.98  Courts throughout the United States 
have hesitated to unambiguously delineate the boundaries of the creativity and originality 
necessary for copyright protection.99  In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Supreme 
Court famously stated that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
                                                     
93 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
94  Id.  The list includes: “literary works; musical works, including any accompanying works; dramatic works, 
including any accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
sound records; and architectural works.”  Id.  
95 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1997) (“[T]he designation ‘works of 
authorship’ is not meant to be limited to traditional works of authorship such as novels or plays.  Rather, Congress 
used this phrase to extend copyright to new methods of expression as they evolve.”). 
96 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
97 For example, at one point in time it was argued that photographs did not have the requisite originality for copyright 
protection because they “simply captured a current reality.”  See Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 
53, 57–58 (1884) (holding that photographs could be considered “writings” and photographers were “authors” for 
purposes of the statute). 
98 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that the alphabetization of listings in 
a telephone directory did not meet the requisite originality standard required to receive copyright protection). There 
the Court stated that "originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles 
other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying." Id. at 345. 
99 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
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law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.”100  Given the subjective nature of deciding whether a work is 
“creative enough,” courts have been consistent in liberally applying the standard of creativity and 
originality.101  The Supreme Court, in defining “creativity,” stated that a work must be an 
“independent creation” that demonstrates a “modicum of creativity.”102  Thus, the Court provided 
a broad definition to respect the subjective nature of creativity.     
B. Copyright in User-Generated Content Posted to Social Media Platforms 
At least some social media posts would in fact meet the base requirement of originality; 
the more creative the posted content, the stronger the copyright protection is likely to be.103  The 
content that users post can typically be split into two classifications: user-generated content and 
user-found content.104  The difference lies in the origination of the content—a user’s own creative 
works are user-generated but information a user reposts or forwards on to others that was found 
elsewhere is user-found content.105  User-generated content can consist of text, images, or videos 
that social media users independently create and post to the Internet.106  A range of user-generated 
content can be found in almost every corner of the Internet, including on blogs, Twitter, YouTube, 
Facebook, Instagram, and even the Wikipedia.107  This content forms part of an emerging network 
of self-expression and self-promotion that has become a hallmark foundation of online social 
                                                     
100 188 U.S. at 251. 
101 See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345. 
102 Id.  
103 See Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (defining “originality” 
to mean only that “the work is independently created rather than copied from other works”) (citations omitted). 
104 Craig C. Carpenter, Copyright Infringement and the Second Generation of Social Media: Why Pinterest Users 
Should Be Protected from Copyright Infringement by the Fair Use Defense, 16 NO. 7 J. INTERNET L. 1, 10 (2013). 
105 Id. 
106 Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Jessica Gutierrez Alm, “Sharing” 
Copyrights: The Copyright Implications of User Content in Social Media, 35 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 104, 111 
(2014) (“A court would likely find social media content to be fixed in tangible form.  Therefore, for those works that 
also meet the originality requirement, this renders at least some user-generated content copyrightable material.”). 
107 See Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One—Investiture of Ownership, 
10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863 (2008).  
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culture.  This content, however, also raises a bevy of issues regarding creativity, collective 
authorship, ownership, and misappropriation of previously copyrighted works.108  In recent years, 
social networking platforms have entrenched themselves into popular culture, bringing with them 
a multitude of copyright complications.109  These platforms have changed the face of the Internet 
in many ways, including bringing a broader visibility to the creative self-expression of the average 
person.  
Once a work has been deemed creative enough, in order to receive protection, the work 
must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.110  User-generated digital content is “fixed” 
when it exists for “more than a transitory period” of time.111  The inquiry into whether a work is 
fixed for more than a “transitory duration” is a fact-sensitive analysis.112  For the most part, content 
posted to social media and social networking sites is not automatically erased.113  It remains stored, 
detectable, and searchable.  Thus, a court would likely find social media content to be fixed in 
tangible form.  Consequently, for authors whose works also meet the originality requirement, their 
user-generated content would constitute copyrightable material. 
Once creativity, originality, and fixation have been established, the creator of the work is 
granted six exclusive copyright ownership rights.114  The six rights are the right to reproduce, 
prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform audiovisual works publicly, perform sound 
recordings publicly, and display publicly.115  When the act of fixation occurs on a social media 
                                                     
108 Id.  
109 Id. 
110 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
111 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  The Copyright Act defines “fixed” as an expression in which a work may be “perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”  Id.  
112 See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008); MAI Sys. Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).  
113 Zach Whittaker, Facebook Does Not Erase User-Deleted Content, ZDNET (Apr. 28, 2010), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-does-not-erase-user-deleted-content/.  
114 17 U.S.C. §106 (2012). 
115 Id. 
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platform, however, an author may find that his or her rights have been automatically altered by the 
hosting website’s Terms of Use.  Social media platforms function as a means to distribute user 
content to other users, therefore as a means of avoiding infringing on users’ copyrights, these 
websites require users to license away the rights to the content they post.116  This is typically 
accomplished when the user presses the “agree” button at the bottom of a webpage that is jam-
packed with dense text.117  The Terms of Use of social media giants such as Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, and Instagram each state that the user retains the rights to any user-generated content.118  
Each platform, however, then requires the user to agree to an overly expansive non-exclusive 
license.  Facebook, for example, states that the user grants a “non-exclusive, transferable, sub-
licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any [intellectual property] content that you post 
on or in connection with Facebook.”119  YouTube and Twitter take it even further and state that 
the license grants the company specific rights.120  YouTube’s license, for example, permits it to 
“reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform” user content.121  This 
                                                     
116 David Berreby, Click to Agree with What? No One Reads Terms of Service, Studies Confirm, THE GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/03/terms-of-service-online-contracts-fine-print. 
117 These types of “contracts,” referred to as “click-wrap agreements,” have typically been upheld by the courts 
because the act of clicking “agree” denotes that the user is aware of the terms and is assenting to those terms.  Kevin 
W. Grieson, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, 
and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5TH 309, 317 n.1 (2003).  A click-wrap agreement is one that “appears when a 
user first installs computer software obtained from an online source or attempts to conduct an Internet transaction 
involving the agreement, and purports to condition further access to the software or transaction on the user’s consent 
to certain conditions there specified; the user ‘consents’ to these conditions by ‘clicking’ on a dialog box on the screen, 
which then proceeds with the remainder of the software installation or Internet transaction.”  Id.  
118 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Nov. 
1, 2017) (“You own all of the content and information you post on Facebook.”); Terms of Service, YOUTUBE 
[hereinafter YouTube Terms of Service], http://www.YouTube.com/t/terms (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (“You retain all 
of your ownership rights in your Content.”); Terms of Service, TWITTER [hereinafter Twitter Terms of Service], 
https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (“You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or 
display.”); Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM [hereinafter Instagram Terms of Service], 
http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (“Instagram does not claim ownership of any 
Content that you post.”). 
119 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 118. 
120 YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 118; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 118. 
121 YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 118.  
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language closely parallels the statutory grant of rights122 and grants licenses to YouTube of all six 
of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights through the Copyright Act as well as the right to sub-
license all six rights.123  These licenses are non-exclusive, and therefore do not transfer 
ownership,124 however, the licenses are so comprehensive that they allow these websites to do 
virtually everything with user-generated content, which should make courts question what, if any, 
rights  do these users have in the face of such allowances.  
C. Is Fair Use Actually Fair? A Fair Use Analysis for Estate of Barre v. Carter et al. 
 
The Second Circuit’s holdings reflect the status quo on the application of the fair use 
doctrine in modern copyright law.125  The Second Circuit’s stance presently suggests a liberal 
standard for analyzing whether an alleged use is sufficiently transformed for its use to be 
considered fair.  Under current fair use jurisprudence, assuming the following two threshold issues 
have been satisfied: that (1) the work is original, fixed, and constitutes expression rather than ideas 
and (2) a defendant violated an exclusive right, a court will examine the four statutory factors of 
fair use.126  In analyzing the first factor, the purpose and content of the work, courts have held that 
when the original work is sufficiently “transformed,” its use will generally be fair.127  The second 
factor of the fair use analysis examines the connection of the original work to copyright’s goals, 
such as the promotion of artistic expression.128  The third factor analyzes the amount and 
                                                     
122 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
123 YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 118. 
124 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership” to include exclusive licenses, but not 
nonexclusive licenses). 
125 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 
568 (2008); Netanel, supra note 55, at 721 (“First, Beebe found that, as measured by case citations, fair use opinions 
from courts of the Second and Ninth Circuits exerted an overwhelming influence on fair use opinions outside those 
Circuits, even more than we might expect.”) 
126 See supra Part III.A. 
127 See supra Part II.B. 
128 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole129 and finally, for 
the fourth factor, the courts must look to the market effect of the alleged infringer’s use.130 
When the Second Circuit’s expansive fair use standards are applied to content posted on 
social media, the results are inadequate copyright protections to the owners of this content.  In the 
lawsuit between the estate of Anthony Barre and defendants Beyoncé Knowles-Carter,131  Khalif 
Brown,132 Michael Len Williams II,133 Sony Music Entertainment, Parkwood Entertainment and 
others involved with song “Formation,” the estate134 alleges that the defendants misappropriated 
and infringed on the estate’s rights under copyright law by featuring the voice of Anthony Barre, 
better known as Messy Mya, saying three phrases135 from his works in the single “Formation,” 
released on February 6, 2016.136  The estate asserts it owns a protectable copyright interest in two 
YouTube videos created by Messy Mya: (1) “Booking the Hoes from New Wildlings;” and (2) “A 
27 Piece Huh?”137  According to the estate, Messy Mya was a well-known performance comedian 
and music artist who published over one hundred videos of his performances, garnering over two 
                                                     
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Beyoncé Knowles-Carter is a Grammy award-winning American singer and songwriter.  David Renshaw, Beyoncé 
is Now The Most-Nominated Woman Artist in Grammy History, THE FADER (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://www.thefader.com/2016/12/06/beyonce-grammy-history. 
132 Khalif Brown is a hip hop recording artist known professionally as “Swae Lee,” one-half of the hip hop duo “Rae 
Sremmurd.”  Erika Ramirez, 18. Rae Sremmurd: 21 Under 21, BILLBOARD (Sept. 11, 2014, 12:51PM), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/6251190/rae-sremmurd-21-under-21-2014 
133 Michael Len Williams II is a music producer professionally known as “Mike Will Made It.”  Andrew Noz, Beat 
Construction: Mike Will Made It, FADER (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.thefader.com/2012/04/30/beat-construction-
mike-will-made-it/ 
134 Tragically, 22-year-old Barre was shot and killed on November 14, 2010 in New Orleans, Louisiana.  Brendan 
McCarthy, Messy Mya, Burgeoning Rapper and YouTube sensation, Identified as 7th Ward Murder Victim, THE 
TIMES-PICAYNE (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/11/7th_ward_murder_victim_identif.html.  Angel Barre, his sister and 
sole heir, brought the herein discussed suit on behalf of his estate.  Estate of Barré v. Carter, No. 17-1057, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 116593 (E.D. La. July 25, 2017). 
135 These three phrases are: “What happened at the New Orleans” from the video “Booking the Hoes from New 
Wildlings,” uploaded to YouTube on August 19, 2010 and “Bitch I’m back, by popular demand,” and “Oh yeah baby. 
I like that” from the video “A 27 Piece Huh?,” uploaded to YouTube on September 3, 2010.  Estate of Barré, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116593, at *5. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at *4. 
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million views on his YouTube channel.138  Messy Mya’s voice, as used in the single “Formation,” 
also appeared on the album “Lemonade” and during the “Formation World Tour.”139  According 
to the estate, no license or compensation was ever obtained to copy any portion of Messy Mya’s 
works.140  In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the use of the sampling 
constituted a protected fair use.141  The judge presiding over the case, however, declined to dismiss 
and the case is presently set to move forward and towards a fair use analysis.142   
In the case of the estate of Messy Mya, it would likely be easy to establish that the estate 
holds a valid copyright in Messy Mya’s YouTube videos.143  Proceeding to the fair use analysis, 
the defendants were quick to assert that their use of audio from Barre’s videos constituted “raw 
material” in the creation of a music video about “black Southern resilience that featured depictions 
of the history and culture of New Orleans.”144  They also assert that the YouTube videos comprised 
only a small component of the Formation music video and the Formation World Tour live 
performances145 and that the small portion of the YouTube clips was utilized for an entirely 
different purpose than the originals.146  The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, is a 
factor favoring the estate.  This factor asks whether the work is a creative work, which receives 
more protection, or if it more informational and functional in nature, which would afford it less 
protection.147  The third factor, amount and substantiality of the portion used,148 stands to favor the 
                                                     
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. at *7. 
141 Bill Donahue, Beyonce Can’t Shake Copyright Suit Over “Formation”, LAW360 (July 26, 2017, 7:05PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/948291. 
142 Id.  
143 See, e.g., Gutierrez Alm, supra note 106, at 111 (“A court would likely find social media content to be fixed in 
tangible form.  Therefore, for those works that also meet the originality requirement, this renders at least some user-
generated content copyrightable material.”). 
144 Estate of Barré, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116593, at *12. 
145 Id.  
146 Id. at *12–13.  
147 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (2014). 
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defendants due to the significantly small amount of audio that was sampled from Messy Mya’s 
YouTube videos.  The Formation music video used only four seconds of a five minute and fourteen 
second clip and six seconds of a one minute and fifty-three second clip, while the Formation World 
Tour live performances used only the former audio clip.149  Finally, using the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the fourth factor, the focus would be on whether the secondary use “usurps the 
market of the original work.”150  As discussed earlier, in Cariou, the Second Circuit held that there 
was no effect on the potential market for the plaintiff’s photographs of Rastafarians as Cariou 
“ha[d] not actively marketed his work or sold his work for significant sums, and nothing in the 
record suggest[ed] that anyone [would] not now purchase Cariou’s work.”151  Under the Cariou 
framework,152 the fourth fair use factor also stands to weigh against the estate.  Using the analogous 
facts of Cariou, supporters of the emphasis on “transformativeness” could make a strong argument 
may be made that the defendant’s use of Messy Mya’s voice was sufficiently transformative.  As 
a result, an analysis of the remaining fair use factors would be moot because, under the standard 
set by the Second Circuit,153 a court is likely to place less of an emphasis on remaining three factors 
in the fair use test when the court deems the transformative factor satisfied.   
When analyzed under the proposed fair use reforms, the defendant’s use of audio from 
Messy Mya’s YouTube videos would not be considered a protectable fair use.  Under the proposed 
reform154 of the analysis, which adopts the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on the market factor,155 the 
fourth factor would weigh heavily in favor of the estate and against the defendants.  According to 
the plaintiff, Messy Mya’s estate never received any compensation for the use of his protected 
                                                     
149 See Estate of Barre, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116593, at *14. 
150 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013). 
151 Id. at 709. 
152 Id. 
153 See Id.  
154 See infra Part IV. 
155 See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) 
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works.156  The defendant’s use of Messy Mya’s clips were highly commercialized157 and parasitic 
in nature.  Removing the enhanced emphasis on transformativeness would allow a court to properly 
balance factors two through four of the fair use test, all of which favor the estate.  Under a reformed 
fair use analysis, the defendants would not be able to reap the benefits of the fair use defense and 
deprive the estate of its deserved statutory damages. 
IV. Why the Lines of “Fair Use” Need to Be Redrawn 
A. The Duty to Reform Fair Use   
Historically, innovation has always posed a challenge to copyright law.158  Inevitably, the 
legal implications surrounding new technologies are unclear at first, and potentially infringing 
conduct becomes rampant before the judiciary or the legislature have the opportunity to address it.  
An early example of this phenomena was the advent of online file sharing in the early 2000s.159  
Illegal Internet file sharing was such an easy way to send and receive content that it became popular 
among millions of users before copyright holders brought lawsuits in waves against individual 
                                                     
156 Estate of Barré v. Carter, No. 17-1057, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116593, *7 (E.D. La. July 25, 2017). 
157 To illustrate, Beyonce’s “Formation World Tour” sold over 2 million tickets, grossing approximately $250 million. 
Ray Waddell, Beyonce’s Formation Tour Sold Over 2 Million Tickets and Made Over $250 Million, BILLBOARD (Oct. 
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copies, making it the top-selling album in the world in 2016.  Dan Rys, Beyonce’s ‘Lemonade’ Highest-Selling Album 
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158 Technological innovations threaten copyright law by revolutionizing the ability to copy and distribute.  See, e.g., 
White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (where an assignee of copyrights on music compositions 
brought suit against player piano sellers); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) 
(where owners of copyrights on motion pictures brought suit against television rebroadcasting company); Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (where owners of copyrights on television programs brought 
suit against manufacturers of videotape recorders).  See generally Vincent J. Roccia, What’s Fair is (Not Always) Fair 
on the Internet, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 155, 163-64 (1997) (discussing copyright law’s response to technologies such as the 
VCR, photocopier, and tape recorder); Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 430–31 (“From its beginning, the law of 
copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology.  Indeed, it was the invention of . . . the 
printing press that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.” (citations omitted)). 
159 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. 
Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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users and software providers.160  As advances in technology continue to give users new ways to 
produce and consume content, there is an increasingly compelling demand for the reimagining and 
reinterpretation of what is copyrightable.  To that end, and to help enhance the predictability of the 
fair use analysis in future jurisprudence, it is imperative to have a national standard grounded in 
Supreme Court precedent.  Although the Supreme Court has analyzed the fair use doctrine over 
the years in other contexts,161 it has not squarely addressed the standard for determining whether 
an unauthorized use is fair since its 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.162  In light 
of the conflicting approaches adopted by the regional circuits regarding fair use,163 the Supreme 
Court needs to step in and reconcile the conflicting decisions.   
Under current fair use jurisprudence, the market effect (the fourth factor) is not as important 
as it once was.164  The fairest application of fair use standards when considering user-generated 
content, however, call for a heightened focus on the market effect, with some modifications from 
the current way courts analyze the factors.  In applying the fair use analysis to user-generated 
content, it makes the most sense, in the interests of fairness, to use a test of commercial exploitation 
when considering the first and fourth factors.  In other words, is the purpose of the secondary use 
simply sharing, free-riding, or is it parasitic?  In determining this, courts should consider whether 
the appropriation is from professional to amateur, peer to peer, or amateur to professional.  In cases 
where the defendant is a professional and the plaintiff an amateur, there must be a higher standard 
                                                     
160 Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 34–35 
(2006). 
161 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012) (addressing the constitutionality of the section of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act granting copyright protection to certain preexisting works); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
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of what constitutes fair use.  Otherwise, young artists and creators of original content posted to 
social media can have their work illegally sampled for the gain of the professional artist without 
just compensation.  In this analysis, a court’s inquiry would consider the commercialization of the 
secondary work: distinguishing between the value gained by the secondary user and the value lost 
by the copyright holder.  Use of this test would prevent a professional from exploiting copyright 
law in a manner that extinguishes the rights of creators of user-generated content, a result that the 
current system seems to sanction.  
The legislative history of the fair use defense demonstrates that fair use is meant to be a 
flexible analysis because it was Congress’ intent that there be “no disposition to freeze the doctrine 
in the statute.”165  Congressional records underscore that “beyond the very broad statutory 
explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to 
adopt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”166  One of the implications of 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou v. Prince has been that the transformativeness inquiry has 
bled into the other three statutory factors.167  For example, for the fourth statutory factor of section 
107, the Second Circuit held that that the correct inquiry is whether the new work completely 
usurps the market for the original, and that the more transformative the new work, the less likely 
it will be that it does so.168  The concept of transformation has crucial ramifications for content 
posted on social media, as digital works are incredibly easy to manipulate and appropriate.169  
Given the Supreme Court’s denial of the petition for certiorari in Kienitz,170 there is an ever-
pressing need to resolve the ongoing conflict in determining how to weigh the first factor 
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emphasizing transformative use against the fourth factor focusing on market effects.  In theory, 
these two factors should be two sides of the same coin because a highly transformative use should 
not cause market harm.171  Emphasizing different factors, however, can potentially cause the same 
facts to yield inconsistent results.  
B. Addressing Critiques and Potential Counterarguments 
Critics of the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on the market effect factor of the statutory fair 
use factors argue that the Kienitz opinion rejects Supreme Court precedent set by Campbell v. 
Acuff-Ross Music, Inc. by eschewing the first factor in favor of the fourth factor.172  This critique, 
however, is unfounded because the Second Circuit’s central argument in Cariou is not grounded 
in Supreme Court precedent; rather it focuses and expands upon one of the many principles 
delineated by Campbell.  In Campbell, the Supreme Court stated that the fair use analysis is: 
not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it 
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.  The text employs the terms “including” 
and “such as” in the preamble paragraph to indicate the “illustrative and not 
limitative” function of the examples given which thus provide only general 
guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had 
found to be fair uses.  Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, 
one from another.  All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light 
of the purposes of copyright.173 
 
Neither the copyright statute, nor the Supreme Court explain which factor is most important in the 
fair use analysis.174  Supporters of emphasizing the market effect factor of fair use argue that the 
transformative test is overly broad,175 while critics of the market effect argue that the problem with 
                                                     
171 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994). 
172 Aaron B. Wicker, Much Ado About Transformativeness: The Seventh Circuit and Market-Centered Fair Use, 11 
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 355, 377 (2016); Alexandra Navratil, Examining the Seventh Circuit’s Repudiation of the 
Transformative Fair Use Analysis: Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC., 27 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 73, 
86 (2016). 
173 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78 (emphasis added). 
174 See supra Part II.  
175 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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the market factor is that it can be construed too broadly.176  Critics also argue that “by definition 
every fair use involves the loss of some royalty revenue.”177  According to critics, if the market 
factor is given serious deference, this factor would never weigh in favor of the secondary user and 
classifying it as the single most important element of fair use would make the fair defense 
defunct;178 however, the same can be, and has been, said of the first factor. 179  By employing a 
more market-based analysis, courts would hearken back to the utilitarian nature of copyright 
jurisprudence: that copyright protection is afforded to encourage and promote the creation of new 
artistic works.  Fair use would still have its place, but with a higher bar set in place.  These circular 
arguments are one of the many reasons the Supreme Court needs to step in and offer guidance on 
the copyright fair use doctrine once and for all.  
V. Conclusion 
In light of the significant differences in how the regional circuits approach fair use, it is 
imperative that the Supreme Court intervene to decide how our judiciary should apply the statutory 
factors and how the issue of “transformative” use should be evaluated to distinguish non-infringing 
fair uses from unauthorized infringing works.  When it does, it will almost certainly have a 
profound impact in shaping the future of copyright jurisprudence, as well as steering the actions 
of artists, social media users, and creators of user-generated content.  Young artists of all kinds 
flock to social media to publicly display their art and hopefully gain attention and fame.  User-
generated content posted to the Internet and social media platforms receive the most basic, and 
oftentimes inadequate, copyright protections.  Although often dismissed as amateurs, creators of 
                                                     
176 Navratil, supra note 172, at 86.  
177 Leval, supra note 10, at 1124. 
178 See Leval, supra note 10, at 1124–25. 
179 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 578–79; Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709–10 (2d 
Cir. 2013); see also Wicker, supra note 172, at 367. 
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user-generated content are indeed copyright owners who should enjoy the full benefits of exclusive 
statutory rights.  Historically, the rights of these users have been left out of consideration and 
potential violations of their rights overlooked.  Under a reformed fair use analysis, these creators 
of user-generated content will stand a better chance of being afforded the protections they deserve 
under statutory copyright law.  As the law currently stands, the economic burden of serving the 
public interest in copyrights is forced onto those that are not in the best place to shoulder it.  In this 
way, the burden for public good is placed on “the little guy” which in turn limits his resources, 
desire, and ability to produce more additional creative works180 which only serves to undermine 
the ultimate goal of copyright law.  
                                                     
180 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015). 
